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Abstract. In this paper, a methodology inspired on bond and site percolation
methods is applied to the estimation of the resilience against failures in power grids.
Our approach includes vulnerability measures with both dynamical and structural
foundations as an attempt to find more insights about the relationships between
topology and dynamics in the second-order Kuramoto model on complex networks.
As test cases for numerical simulations, we use the real-world topology of the
Colombian power transmission system, as well as randomly generated networks with
spatial embedding. It is observed that, by focusing the attacks on those dynamical
vulnerabilities, the power grid becomes, in general, more prone to reach a state of
total blackout, which in the case of node removal procedures it is conditioned by the
homogeneity of power distribution in the network.
Keywords: Kuramoto model, power grid, basin stability, resilience, stability, percolation.
1. Introduction
Emergence of synchronization in systems of agents, coupled through local interactions,
is a widely studied phenomenon with multiple applications in physics, biology and social
sciences [1, 2, 3]. In particular, the optimal functioning of a power grid, which represents
one of the most complex interacting systems in engineering, highly depends on its ability
to maintain a synchronous operation over time despite external disturbances. Losing
that synchrony, even locally, may lead to cascading failures and complete blackout of the
network [4, 5, 6]. Two main concerns have motivated the discussion around dynamical
analysis and design of power grids in the last years, those are: the strong economical
and social impact that a power outage could cause in the highly electricity-dependant
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modern society [7], and the slow transition to renewable energy sources that is being
promoted all around the world [8, 9], since it is known that renewable and small power
producers have negligible inertia, which imposes instability risks in the power grids [10].
Multiple models have been proposed for the analysis of synchronization in power grids,
and they differ mainly in the way loads, power generators and transmission lines are
modeled [11]. Probably the most common model is the one called synchronous motor,
where both, generators and consumers are represented by second-order synchronous
machines [12]. This model is essentially equivalent to the celebrated Kuramoto model
when inertia terms are considered [13, 14, 15]. Self-synchronization behavior in this
model occurs when the interactions between connected oscillators are sufficiently strong
to overcome the dissimilarity in the ensemble [4, 16, 17, 18].
Recently, the scientific community has put a lot of effort in trying to determine
the topological or structural features of those interactions that can enhance or
undermine non-linear stability of a power grid, that is, its capability to reject finite-
size disturbances, a matter of paramount importance in the design of the future smart
grids. This has been approached, for instance, by the means of energy barrier functions
[19] and the basin stability concept [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Some interesting findings
that deserve to be mentioned, as they provide great insights about the relationship
between topology and dynamical stability include: the poor basin stability usually
detected on dead-tree arrangements [20], the strong stability found on triangle-shaped
motifs [26], the enhanced non-linear stability achieved by increasing global redundancy
in the connections [27] or by adding small cyclic motifs [19] and the lower basin stability
exhibited in general by high-power generator nodes in [28]. Other studies have focused on
estimating the resilience of the complex network against cascading failures [29, 6, 30], the
robustness in the transient behavior after localized disturbances [31] and their diffusion
through the interconnected system [10].
In the present work, a percolation inspired method is presented in order to evaluate
the resilience of a power grid against random and focalized disturbances. By defining a
vulnerability measure in terms of the dynamical properties of both, nodes and edges, it
is found that, attacks that focus on the weakest components of the network, can easily
provoke cascading failures that lead to total blackout faster than random attacks in some
specific cases. Note that, in the following, the term total blackout refers to the situation
when no operational composition of at least one generator and one consumer exists in
the network. Test cases chosen for this study include randomly generated networks
with spatial embedding that emulate properties of real-world power grids, as well as the
particular case of the Colombian power transmission network. It is also found that, by
attacking the most dynamically-loaded transmission lines in the graph, the power system
reaches blackout faster than any other bond-percolation criterion, while, for the site-
percolation methods, it is produced by attacking the most dynamically vulnerable nodes,
but only if the distribution of power generation and consumption is not homogeneous,
which often occurs in real-world architectures.
A similar work can be found in [32], where the authors use centrality measures,
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namely, the node degree, clustering coefficient and betweenness centrality, to estimate
the vulnerability of a node and then proceed to remove weakest nodes to observe the
evolution of the giant component in the network as a function of the number of remaining
nodes in the whole graph. This structural approach to quantify the node vulnerability
will be also used in this work to compare results of removal methods based on dynamical
measurements. Other relevant works have to be mentioned; for instance, based on the
statistical physics description of networks, some basic percolation properties for different
networks have been analysed using generating functions [33], the lifetime and reliability
of networks has been estimated by setting some probability distributions for node
failures [34] and the propagation of cascading failures through the power transmission
or communication architecture of smart grids has also been modeled [35].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the dynamical
model of a power grid and the structure of the specific test cases, as well as some
theoretical tools that will be applied in further analysis of synchronization and
vulnerability measurements. Section 3 presents an algorithm for resilience assessment
of power grids and results regarding line and node removal procedures over synthetic
power grids and the Colombian transmission network. Finally, some concluding remarks
are discussed in section 4.
2. Model and methods
In this paper, the framework of the synchronous motor representation is used to model
the general structure and dynamics of power grids [11, 12], since it has been employed
constantly and successfully in the past years, as mentioned in the previous section. This
approach is described in the following.
2.1. Power grid model
As a simplified model of a real-world power grid, consider a system of N interacting
synchronous machines arranged in a connected graph G(ϑ, ε), with a set of nodes
ϑ = {1, 2, ..., N} and a set of edges ε ⊂ ϑ × ϑ, such that the amount of edges is
|ε| = M . Nodes can be labeled as generator machines (supply energy to the grid) or
consumer machines (demand energy from the grid), thus ϑ = ϑg ∪ ϑc, being ϑg the set
of generators and ϑc the set of consumers.
Let the dynamical state of each machine be represented by its phase angle φi and
its phase velocity φ˙i := dφi/dt, i ∈ ϑ. Under an appropriate operation of the power
grid, it is expected that every machine will be rotating at some reference frequency
Ω = 2pif (where by convention f is either 50 Hz or 60 Hz), so let θi(t) = φi(t) − Ωt
be the phase deviation of the machine i with respect to the reference angle Ωt, then
the dynamical behavior of θi and its velocity θ˙i can be described by the well-known
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Figure 1: Colombian Power Grid: (a) Topology of the network with N = 102 and
M = 158. Generating nodes Ng = 28 (cross symbols) and Nc = 74 consumer nodes
(circle symbols). (b)-(e) Distribution of the node degree dk, clustering coefficient ck,
node betweenness centrality bk and edge betweenness centrality ek. (f)-(g) Time trace of
the phases and phase velocities of each oscillator when the grid converges to a frequency
synchronized state (red lines: generators, blue lines: consumers).
second-order Kuramoto model for coupled oscillators given by [12, 16]:
θ¨i(t) = Pi − αiθ˙i(t) +K
N∑
j
aij sin(θj(t) − θi(t)) (1)
where Pi is equal to the injected (drained) power at the i-th node up to a scaling factor,
and it is positive (negative) for generators (consumers); αi is related to the damping
coefficient of the i-th machine, aij are the elements of the adjacency matrix A, thus,
aij = 1 if nodes i and j are connected (that is, (i, j) ∈ ε) and aij = 0 otherwise. The
constant K is the maximum power transfer capacity between any pair of connected
nodes, which depends on the impedance of transmission lines connecting them. This
equation is derived when the ohmic losses on transmission lines are neglected, an equal
impedance level is assumed for every transmission line in the network and the deviations
from the phase velocity at any node as compared to the reference Ω are small, that is
|θ˙i|  Ω, ∀i ∈ ϑ [12, 16].
The dynamical system described by equation (1) is said to be in a phase
synchronized state if θi(t) = θj(t), ∀i, j ∈ ϑ, and in a frequency synchronized state
if θ˙i(t) = θ˙j(t) = ωs, ∀i, j ∈ ϑ. Since we are interested in the dynamics around the
synchronization frequency Ω, it can be assumed without loss of generality that ωs = 0,
which amounts to consider the dynamics in the co-rotating reference frame Ωt (see
[4]). In the following, the topology of G(ϑ, ε) is taken from the Colombian National
Transmission System [36], a power grid composed of 158 edges and 102 nodes (28 of
them are generators and 74 are consumers). Power supplied by generators is set to
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Pk = 1.0, ∀k ∈ ϑg, and the power drained by consumers is uniformly distributed such
that the power balance condition in the network is fulfilled, that is:
N∑
i=1
Pi = 0. (2)
This condition is a requirement in order to allow the existence of a locally-stable
equilibrium point in the system [16]. Finally, the damping and maximum power transfer
are fixed to αi = 0.1 and K = 12.0 respectively. Figure 1(a) shows the topology of the
network with the tree-like node classification introduced in [22]. Panels (b)-(e) present
distributions for some classic centrality measures of the graph: node degree, clustering
coefficient [37], node betweenness and edge betweenness centrality [38]. Panels (f) and
(g) display the behavior of θ(t) and θ˙(t) for every oscillator when the system converges
from an unsynchronized state to a frequency synchronized regime given the parameters
above. Aiming for a generalization of the results, random test cases were also used
and compared to the Colombian test case just described; to do that, synthetic power
grids were generated with the algorithm proposed in [39], which is specially useful as
it creates spatially embedded networks that emulate connectivity distributions of real-
world power grids. Synthetic networks were constructed by initializing a tree-like base
architecture and then following a growth procedure conditioned by the optimization
of a redundancy-cost function that depends on both, geographic distance and number
of paths separating each pair of nodes in the graph. For a detailed description of the
algorithm, refer to Appendix A. The parameters used for the growth model algorithm
were chosen to match those used on [22], as presented in table 1. Note that the final
size of the network is fixed to N = 102 so that it matches the Colombian power grid
size, nevertheless, geographic positions for nodes are chosen uniformly at random and
an equal amount of generators and consumers is placed to reduce heterogeneity in the
samples (thus, Pk = 1.0, ∀k ∈ ϑg and Pj = −1.0, ∀j ∈ ϑc).
Table 1: Parameters for the construction of synthetic power grids.
Parameter Value
N0: An initial amount of nodes, N0 ≥ 1. 1
N : Final amount of nodes that the network will have N > N0. 102
y = {y1, y2, ..., yN}: Geographical location of nodes. yk ∼ U[0,1]
p: Probability of constructing additional redundancy links
attached to new nodes (0 ≤ p ≤ 1).
1/5
q: Probability of constructing additional redundancy links
between existing nodes (0 ≤ q ≤ 1).
3/10
s: Probability of splitting an existing line (0 ≤ s ≤ 1). 1/10
u: Cost-vs-redundancy trade-off parameter for equation A.1. 1/3
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2.2. Synchronization measures
A helpful indicator that quantifies the degree of synchronization is the complex-valued
order parameter r defined as [40]:
reiΨ(t) =
1
N
N∑
j
eiθj(t) (3)
Here, Ψ(t) is the average phase of the oscillators at time t. If all phases θj are
identical, the magnitude of the order parameter is r(t) = 1. Conversely, if they are equally
distributed around the unit circle r(t) = 0 and the system is said to be desynchronized.
Intermediate values of r correspond to partially synchronized states. Additionally, in
the case of power grids in which equation (2) holds, when the system is synchronized
the average phase is Ψ(t) = 0, and the real part of the order parameter IR[r] = 1, while
it oscillates around zero otherwise. While the dependence of the order parameter with
time is useful in transient analysis, we will focus on the steady state behavior, so we
can define the average order parameter in steady state as [16]:
r∞ = lim
t1→∞
[
lim
t2→∞
(
1
t2
∫ t1+t2
t1
r(t)dt
)]
(4)
Another measure of frequency synchronization in power grids is the squared average
rotational speed v2(t) defined as [16]:
v2(t) =
1
N
N∑
j
θ˙2j(t) (5)
and the associated steady state value of the speed v∞:
v∞ =
√
lim
t1→∞
[
lim
t2→∞
(
1
t2
∫ t1+t2
t1
v2(t)dt
)]
. (6)
2.3. Edge vulnerability
Following the results in [4], it can be proven that, by applying a small-angle
approximation, the phases at the frequency synchronized equilibrium point, which are
denoted by θ∗ ∈ IRN , can be estimated as:
θ∗ ≈ 1
K
L†P (7)
where L† is the pseudo-inverse of the Laplacian matrix, which is computed through
the adjacency matrix as L = diag(
∑n
j=1 aij)−A. Let us now define the oriented incidence
matrix B = {bij} ∈ RN×M , with:
bij =

1 if node i incides in edge j
−1 if edge j incides in node i
0 otherwise
(8)
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Note that although G is an undirected graph, a direction for each edge can be
assumed without loss of generality for the following analysis, allowing for this definition
of B. Under these circumstances, the steady state phase difference between any pair of
connected nodes (i, j) ∈ ε can be approximated by:
∆θ ≈ 1
K
BTL†P (9)
with ∆θ ∈ RM . Then, the system (1) is guaranteed to have a unique and stable solution
with synchronized frequencies and cohesive phases if the next sufficient condition for ∆θ
holds:
||∆θ||∞ < sin(γ) (10)
with 0 ≤ γ < pi/2. In the limit γ → pi/2, equation (10) simply reduces to ||∆θ||∞ < 1.
In other words, equation (10) states that, in order to achieve synchronization, the largest
difference between the phases of connected pairs in the network has to be smaller than pi/2
[4]. This rather simple equation, readily connects topological and dynamical features
of the network. While condition (10) is only sufficient, it is a rapid way to assess
synchronization without relying on the computationally expensive time evolution of a
large number of phase oscillators. Moreover, equation (10) provides an approximation
to the critical value Kc of the coupling strength when substituting from (9):
Kc ≈ ||BTL†P ||∞ (11)
In figure 2(a), it is shown the behavior of the steady state order parameter IR[r∞]
as a function of the coupling strength K. As seen in the figure and the insets, the real
part of the order parameter oscillates around zero when the coupling strength is small,
and therefore its average value is zero. At a critical coupling strength Kc ≈ 1.51, the
system achieves a state of phase cohesiveness characterized by IR[r∞] ≈ 1 indicating a
synchronized regime. The same transition can be observed by looking at the average
velocity in figure 2(b). In particular, it can be seen that before the synchronization
transition, a finite and different than zero, steady-state value for the angular velocity
is obtained, indicating that the phases of the oscillators increase constantly and no
equilibrium is reached. After the transition, v(t) abruptly decreases to zero, meaning
that the phases of the oscillators remain in a steady state.
In both figures, it is possible to see as well the accuracy of the sufficient condition
(11), where the critical value is indicated by the vertical dashed line, showing a good
agreement with the numerical value of the transition. This evidence supports the use
of condition (10) as a synchronization requisite in the following analysis. Note that the
chosen value of K = 12.0 mentioned before is justified here, since K > Kc, thus it allows
for a synchronized state to exist.
As a measure of the vulnerability of each transmission line, we take advantage of
the equation (9), given that the edge (i, j) is considered weak when |∆θ(i, j)| is close to
1, while it is considered more stable when it is close to 0, regarding the synchronization
limit imposed by (10). This approach is equivalent to that presented in [41, 42], where
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Figure 2: Synchronization for the Colombian power grid: (a) Average steady state
value of the real part of the order parameter as a function of the coupling strength
K. Left (right) inset shows the time trace of IR[r(t)] before (after) critical coupling. (b)
Average rotational speed as a function of K. As in (a), insets show time traces before
and after critical coupling. In both cases, vertical dashed line depicts the value of Kc
calculated with equation (11).
the weakness of an edge is measured as the power transferred between the linked nodes
(line load), except that here, the steady state of the system is approximated immediately
from equation (9).
2.4. Nodal vulnerability
Consider a multistable dynamical system that evolves in the state space X and let
X∗ ⊂ X be the set of desirable attracting states. The basin of attraction of X∗, noted
by β, is defined as the set of all initial conditions x(0) that asymptotically converge to X
∗
[20]. For the purpose of this work, X∗ will be the frequency synchronization manifold of
the system (1). Similarly, the likelihood of a randomly perturbed trajectory to return
back to β, known as the basin stability SB, can be defined as [20, 21]:
SB(β) =
∫
Γβ(x)ρ(x)dx (12)
where Γβ(x) is a function that indicates whether a state x belongs to the basin of
attraction of X∗ or not, that is
Γβ(x) =
{
1 ∀x ∈ β
0 ∀x /∈ β (13)
The function ρ(x) is the density of states to which the system can be pushed by
some non-local perturbation, such that
∫
X
ρ(x)dx = 1. Note that under this definition,
the basin stability is a number between 0 and 1, being SB = 0 when the synchronous
state is unstable and SB = 1 when it is globally stable.
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Monte Carlo simulations can be performed in order to estimate SB by randomly
sampling a sufficiently high number of disturbed states IC (following a certain
distribution ρ(x)) from a representative subspace Π ⊂ X, and using them as the initial
conditions for time-evolution simulations. For this work, ρ(x) is chosen as an uniform
distribution in the restricted subspace Π, that is:
ρ(x) =

1
|Π| ∀x ∈ Π
0 ∀x /∈ Π
(14)
Finally, the amount FC of simulated trajectories that are found to approach
asymptotically to the attractor is assumed to be proportional to the volume of the basin
of attraction (restricted to the subspace Π), thus SB is approximated by SB ≈ FC/IC.
Now, making use of the concept of basin stability we can define an indicator of the
robustness of a node against large perturbations applied to it, by means of the single-
node basin stability (SNBS) [21, 23], given by:
S
(i)
B =
FC
IC
, i ∈ ϑ (15)
where the IC initial conditions are drawn from perturbations applied to node i. As
illustration, figure 3 shows the phase plane of some node i subject to large disturbances;
its SNBS is, loosely speaking, the number of crosses divided by the number of total
datapoints. Throughout this work, the disturbances for each node are drawn from the
subspace Π = [−pi, pi]× [−100, 100].
2.5. Structural vulnerability
Equations (9) and (15) define already a dynamical vulnerability for edges and nodes,
respectively. Furthermore a vulnerability based merely on the connectivity features of
the complex network could also be considered, since it is intuitive that by removing
a highly connected node or a certain critically located edge could lead to a rapid
diminishing on power grid stability and performance. In that regard, let us define
structural vulnerability in terms of the following centrality measures:
• Degree centrality d(i)k : Amount of nodes to which node i is connected, normalized
by the maximum possible degree in the network. It can be computed as:
d
(i)
k =
1
N − 1
N∑
j
aij (16)
• Clustering coefficient c(i)k : Number of triangles (Ti) in which node i is involved,
normalized by the maximum possible amount of such triangles [37], that is:
c
(i)
k =
Ti
d
(i)
k (d
(i)
k − 1)
(17)
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Figure 3: Phase space of a node i of the Colombian grid when random disturbances
are applied to θi or θ˙i. Green crosses are initial conditions that return to the frequency
synchronized state, while the blue circles are out of the basin of attraction. The red
dashed line denotes the subspace Π from which disturbances are chosen. This diagram
was created by sampling IC = 500 points.
• Node betweenness centrality b(i)k : Sum of the shortest paths between every pair of
nodes (s, t) in the network that pass through node i:
b
(i)
k =
∑
s 6=t6=i∈ϑ
σs,t(i)
σs,t
(18)
where σs,t is the amount of shortest paths between nodes s and t and σs,t(i) is the
number of those paths that pass through node i [38].
• Edge betweenness centrality e(l)k : In the same fashion as bk measures centrality for
a node, ek does it for an edge; it is simply defined as the number of shortest paths
in the network that include edge l:
e
(l)
k =
∑
s 6=t∈ϑ
σs,t(l)
σs,t
, l ∈ ε (19)
So in this work, a node will be considered structurally weak if dk, ck or bk is high.
Similarly, an edge will be considered structurally weak if its ek is high.
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Figure 4: Node removal algorithm under the SB-focused attacking scheme. Circle nodes
indicate consumers while crosses represent generators. Node color is mapped with the
S
(i)
B (computed with IC = 50) and the size of the node is proportional to the power Pi.
The red arrow indicates the node that is going to be suppressed. Also, the inset shows
the histogram of the basin stability for the whole network. One realization is presented
in panels (a)-(d) and a different one in panels (e)-(h) in order to visualize two different
mechanisms of cluster vanishing.
3. Resilience measures
In order to assess the resilience of a power grid, we propose a percolation-based
algorithm. To do so, we will follow the capability of the network to maintain its
functioning upon different node removal (site percolation) and edge removal (bond
percolation) rules. In particular, the algorithm that will be described below removes a
node or an edge from the graph on each iteration by applying a random attack, where
the element to be removed is chosen uniformly at random; or a focal attack, where the
most vulnerable node or edge in the graph is removed first. Here, the most vulnerable
node is the one with the lowest basin stability (S
(i)
B ) or the highest degree centrality (dk),
clustering coefficient (ck) or node betweenness centrality (bk); while the most vulnerable
edge is the one for which phase difference (∆θ(i, j)) or edge betweenness centrality (ek)
is the highest.
The percolation-based algorithm then proceeds as such:
(i) Remove a node (edge) by applying a random or a focal attack. Note that in a focal
attack, multiple nodes (edges) could share the same vulnerability level, in that case,
the attacked node is chosen randomly among them.
(ii) Compute the existing disconnected clusters in the new graph.
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(iii) For each cluster, check if it contains at least one generator node and one consumer
node, if it does not, remove the whole cluster from the graph.
(iv) For each remaining cluster the power has to be compensated, so as a way to simulate
a real-world power control (where the supplied power level is increased or reduced
according to the demand of the consumers), the power of all generators in the
cluster is modified uniformly such that equation (2) remains true.
(v) For each remaining cluster, check whether or not it is synchronizable, that is, its
topology satisfies the synchronization condition thatK > Kc, whereKc is computed
by the approximation (11). If it does not, the whole cluster is removed from the
graph.
(vi) Measure the needed observables and return to step 1 until the whole power grid
has gone to blackout, that is, no operational cluster exists in the network.
An important remark has to be done about the algorithm, regarding node removal
under the focal attack methodology based on SNBS. Computing this vulnerability index
is computationally expensive since it requires a large amount of time-domain simulations
in order to estimate reasonably well the equation (15). Thus, in the following, for the
SB-focused percolation, only 10 simulations are considered for averaging purposes, while
for each of the other cases, 500 simulations are performed. It is also worth noting that
the fine structure of the basin of attraction is not captured by this approach, and it
could impose numerical problems on dynamical systems that posses either fractal basin
boundaries or riddled or intermingled basins [43].
For this elimination procedure, two main phase transitions will be analysed:
• Transition T1: This transition occurs at the iteration when the graph is divided
into multiple functional subgraphs for the first time (turning from a connected
graph to an unconnected graph).
• Transition T2: The final iteration of the algorithm, when the power grid goes to
complete blackout.
Figure 4 illustrates the algorithm for nodal resilience measurement under focal attacks.
The transition from the frame (a) to (b) shows the formation of 2 independent clusters
after removing one node. Note that in the frame (c) there is only one generator in
the northern cluster, and interestingly, it has a very poor basin stability level, so when
that node is removed from (c) to (d), the whole northern cluster goes to blackout. A
different realization is presented in panels (e)-(h); note that from (g) to (h) it suffices to
remove one node to bring the bigger cluster to blackout even though there would still
remain connected subgraphs with both generators and consumers. This occurs because
the remaining cluster would have a topology that does not sattisfy the synchronization
condition (10) and thus it vanishes. Similarly, figure 5 shows the algorithm in action
under ∆θ-focused attacks. In the transition from panel (b) to (c), it can be appreciated
that, after suppressing a very vulnerable transmission line, a significant cluster of
isolated consumers in the east side of the network vanishes.
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Figure 5: Edge removal algorithm under the focal attacking scheme. Edge color is
mapped with the ∆θ of the nodes it connects. The red arrow indicates the edge that is
going to be supressed. Also, the inset shows the histogram of the phase differences for
the whole network.
3.1. Node removal resilience for the Colombian power grid
Figure 6(a) shows the fraction of nodes in the largest cluster of the network (also called
the giant component of the graph and denoted by C) subject to node removal with focal
and random attacking policies. Similarly, figure 6(b) presents the fraction of removed
nodes after each iteration with respect to the original size (named removed component
and denoted by (N(0)−N(I))/N(0), being N(0) and N(I) the original size of G and its size
after I removal iterations, respectively), which allows to detect the phase transition T2,
corresponding to the iteration at which (N(0)−N(I))/N(0) = 1. It is thus observed that the
grid goes to complete blackout around 30th removal iteration for the case of the focal
attacking on SB, and around the 62nd iteration for the random attacking. For dk and
bk the transition occurs at the 40th iteration and for the random and ck cases, we have
the less effective removal technique since this transition occurs around the 60th attack.
The fact that attacking the most vulnerable nodes based on SB produces a faster
transition to the total blackout state of the network than just removing nodes at
random implies that there is indeed a relationship between the stability of a node
against dynamical disturbances (related to the SNBS) and the structural connectivity
and resilience to cascading failures of the graph.
Furthermore, by focusing the attacks on nodes with the highest bk or dk, the
dimension of the giant component goes down drastically during the first elimination
iterations and then it goes down at a slower rate, reaching total blackout in an
intermediate level of attacks between the SB and random methodologies. ck on the
other hand, produces a slower reduction of the graph size and a total blackout with the
most iterations in average. This is related to the tree-like structure of the power grid that
can be seen on figure 1. In this kind of topologies, the nodes with the higher degree and
betweenness are located at the bulk regions of the graph, therefore, their removal likely
divides the giant component instantly into multiple smaller clusters, as also confirmed by
the figure 6(d), where it is shown that these methodologies produce by far, the highest
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Iteration
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
|S
G
|
Random
Focused on dk
Focused on ck
Focused on bk
Focused on SB
(d) Amount of operational clusters in the network.
Figure 6: Evolution in the structure of the Colombian power grid subject to the nodal
elimination algorithm. The shading accounts for the standard deviation calculated over
10 realizations with IC = 50 for the SB-focused methodology and 500 realizations for
the other attacking schemes.
amount of operational clusters (quantity denoted by |SG|) during the whole procedure.
Correspondingly, a node with a high clustering coefficient, by definition, implies that the
neighbours that it is connected to, are also connected between them, hence, removing
it is not going to divide the graph and generate new clusters. Eventually, after multiple
node eliminations, redundant links between said neighbours will be suppressed and ck
will become uniform over the whole system. That is the reason why this attacking
strategy behaves roughly in the same way as the random attacking one after a few
iterations.
Figure 6(c) plots the size of the second largest component of the graph C2, which
reveals the location of the phase transition T1 as the first iteration when C2 jumps
from 0 to a non-zero value. This figure shows, as expected, that the dk and bk attacking
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Figure 7: Evolution in the structure of the randomly grown synthetic power grids
subject to the nodal elimination algorithm. The shading accounts for the standard
deviation calculated over 10 realizations with IC = 50 for the SB-focused methodology
and 500 realizations for the other attacking schemes.
policies generate in a couple of iterations a new cluster composed by a significant amount
of nodes (peaking roughly at 40% of the nodes), while random and ck focal methods
generate smaller subgraphs and the transition takes in average, a higher attacking effort.
Interestingly, the transition to an unconnected graph composed of multiple functioning
clusters for the SB case, takes several iterations (at least 15 iterations) and it occurs
closer to the total blackout transition (about 30 iterations) than any other methodology.
This behavior is further complemented with figure 6(d), here, the SB focal strategy
generates very few clusters as compared to the others; this is likely related again to
the tree-like topology of the Colombian power grid and to the observed phenomenon in
[21], where nodes located on dead-tree arrangements (more specifically, inner tree nodes
[22]), were found to exhibit, in general, a lower SNBS than the rest of the nodes. As
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these are some of the nodes that are more likely to be removed first under SB focal
attacks, and as by definition they do not have a significant amount of connections, the
graph does not segregate on multiple clusters that easily.
Table 2 summarizes the average value of the transitions for the node removal
algorithm applied to the Colombian power grid.
Table 2: Average value of T1 and T2 for the nodal resilience testing algorithm in the
Colombian grid.
Random Node bk ck dk S
k
B
T1 14.41 3.00 28.77 3.18 20.60
T2 61.92 40.85 65.03 40.54 29.80
3.2. Node removal resilience for synthetic power grids
To test the generality of the results shown for the Colombian power grid, the process is
repeated for a set of synthetic power grids, which are generated as described in section
2.1. Results on the nodal resilience for these synthetic power grids are presented in figure
7. It is surprising that, besides the wider standard deviation in every trace (which was
to be expected considering the randomness in the generation of the complex network),
every other behavior related to the elimination based on bk, ck, dk and even the random
attacking method is identical to that observed in the specific case of the Colombian power
grid in figure 6. This confirms the fact that the algorithm proposed in [39] is indeed
capable of reproducing real-world examples of networked power systems, but also reveals
that an homogeneous power distribution did not have, in average, a significant impact
in the transition to blackout for these specific attacking schemes. This is not surprising,
as bk, ck and dk are structure-based vulnerabilities and completely independent of the
dynamical vulnerabilities. The SB-focused attacking, however, shows a very different
evolution, similar to that of the random attacks, except in figure 7(d), where SB attacks
keep producing the lowest amount of clusters, which is related to the same explanation
given before: the nodes located at dead-tree arrangements usually possess low SNBS
levels, and their removal hardly generates new functional clusters. For reference, the
values for the transitions T1 and T2 on the synthetic power grids are presented in table 3.
Table 3: Average value of T1 and T2 for the resilience testing algorithm in the synthetic
power grids.
Random Node bk ck dk S
k
B
T1 10.20 2.35 19.58 2.50 27.00
T2 61.62 39.91 63.22 39.02 54.30
It seems quite natural to think that, as the random networks have more generator
nodes and they are randomly distributed over the graph, the iteration for which the
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transition to blackout occurs would, for any of the attacking methods, be higher than the
Colombian case since after each removal step the probability to obtain non-operational
clusters would be reduced, yet it only happens for the SB-focused one, as can be also
confirmed by comparing tables 2 and 3. Next section focuses the discussion around the
effects of these power heterogeneity in the resilience profiles observed.
3.3. Influence of power heterogeneity
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Iteration
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
N
Ng
Nc
(a) Colombian power grid.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Iteration
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
Ng
Nc
(b) Synthetic power grids.
Figure 8: Number of consumers Nc and generators Ng existing in the graph on each
iteration of the SB-focused removal algorithm. The shading accounts for the standard
deviation over the 10 random realizations with IC = 50.
Figure 8 shows the amount of generators Ng and consumers Nc after each iteration
in both, the Colombian power grid and the synthetic power grids, and it allows to see
how the node elimination is working: for the random synthetic power grids in average,
both, consumers and generators are being eliminated at the same rate, this leads to
believe that every new cluster created in the network preserves a comparable number
of both kind of nodes and that homogeneity makes the total destruction of said cluster
less likely. This also explains why, in average, T2 for the SB-method is close to that
of the random case (table 3) and hints that the main reason why clusters are being
removed from the graph is because the synchronization condition is not satisfied (step 5
in the resilience testing algorithm), rather than the absence of generators and consumers
(step 3 of the algorithm). Nevertheless, for the Colombian power grid the decreasing
slope for Ng is faster than that of Nc for the first iterations. Since the initial amount of
generators is lower than the initial amount of consumers in this test case, after some of
the nodes in the former group have been removed from the graph, the resulting clusters
are more likely to be consumers isolated without a connected generator, subsequently,
these clusters go to blackout. This implies that the main reason why clusters are being
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Figure 9: SNBS of each generator node as a function of the power it supplies to the
network. Red dashed line marks the initial set power P = 1.0.
suppressed from the Colombian grid is the absence of generators in them (step 3 of the
algorithm), and explains why T2 in the SB-focused method is the lowest value in table 2.
In addition, as mentioned in the algorithm, the power supplied by each generator
is modified after each percolation step in order to maintain the power balance in the
grid. Figure 9 shows the SNBS of each generator node in the complex network as
a function of P . For both study cases: the Colombian power grid and the randomly
grown synthetic power grids, it can be observed that, as the power of the node increases,
its stability diminishes; this comes from the fact that P acts as a measure of the stress in
the node, that is, the energy demand that it needs to satisfy: having to provide energy
for a higher amount of consumer nodes, a generator becomes then more susceptible to
random perturbations, as indicated by the reduction on S
(i)
B . After performing a Pearson
correlation testing between S
(i)
B and P
(i), a correlation coefficient σ and a p-value pval
was found as (σ, pval) = (−0.605, 0) for the Colombian grid and (σ, pval) = (−0.221, 0)
for the synthetic grids, confirming the existence of a negative relationship between both
variables; which is in accordance with the general behavior observed in the recent results
shown in [28]. This result, as well as the previous observation on the resilience to
blackout for SB, can be contrasted with the results presented in [16], where it was found
that, by distributing the demand among multiple small power generators, instead of
a few big power plants, the value of the critical coupling Kc usually diminishes, thus
synchronization is favoured, but for disturbances applied to power consumption, the
most robust performance was found when there is a mixture of both, small and big
power generators.
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Figure 10: Percentage of weak nodes in the network as a function of the percolation
iteration.
3.4. Distribution of vulnerable nodes
Let us now consider weak nodes as those that exhibit a SNBS lower than 0.4, then the
fraction of weak nodes can be expressed as:
ηw(I) =
Nw(I)
N(I)
(20)
where Nw(I) and N(I) are respectively the number of weak nodes and the total amount
of nodes in the graph at iteration I of the resilience testing algorithm. Figure 10 shows
the behaviour of ηw after each iteration for the SB-focused attacking algorithm. From
this figure, a rather counterintuitive observation emerges: in general, for both test cases,
removing the most vulnerable nodes in the network is causing an overall reduction of the
stability of the whole power grid. This implies that, although attacking nodes with a
poor SNBS does not ensure a faster transition to blackout than other strategies, it does
make the whole grid more prone to dynamical disturbances in oscillation frequency and
phase angle. It is worth noting that, results on figure 10 are statistically less reliable
in the last iterations due to the fact that each power grid reaches total blackout at a
different iteration value in general, thus, last iterations are not averaging necessarily
over 10 realizations as the first iterations are.
Another important analysis that can be performed is observing how the critical
iterations for which the phase transitions occur, are affected for the parameters in the
system. In that regard, for the node resilience procedure over synthetic power grids, T1
and T2 were calculated over variations in the coupling strength K as shown in figure 11,
where each data point is the average of 10 simulations for the SNBS method and 500
simulations for the other methods. It should be noted that by decreasing K below 10,
T1 for the SNBS case becomes lower than the random case in average, hinting that the
effect where weaker nodes are located mainly in inner-tree nodes is more noticeable when
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K is somewhat large, while for lower K, the weak nodes are spread all around the graph.
This is understandable since, in general, it can be expected that the basin stability of a
node is increased when the coupling of the network is enhanced (this behavior however
is not monotonic for all nodes, as pointed out in [44, 45]). For the random and the
topology-dependant elimination methods, no tendency is observed for T1 when varying
K.
T2 on the other hand shows an evident increase for any removal method when
the coupling strength is increased. As shown in figure 11(b), random and topological-
based elimination methods seem to reach a plateau when K is sufficiently high. This
reduction in the variability of T2 is because for a higher K, the network becomes more
robust to lose clusters due to lack of synchronization (step 5 in the algorithm) and thus,
clusters are removed merely by the lack of generators and consumers (step 3) or by single
elimination (step 1 and 2). The number of attacks required to reach blackout on either
of those two cases depends mostly on the initial construction of the network, therefore it
should not vary significantly among multiple experiments. The SNBS removal depends
on the system dynamics, thus its curve does not flat as the others for the observed range,
however it is expected to behave in the same way for a significantly higher K, when the
set point in any node becomes globally stable in Π.
3.5. Edge removal resilience
Continuing now with the analysis for the edge removal procedure, figure 12 presents
the evolution of the Colombian graph under this methodology. The difference between
the random and focal schemes is remarkable on these simulations: by focusing attacks
on transmission lines with higher loads ∆θ(i, j), the size of the power grid goes down
rapidly and reaches total blackout faster than other alternatives.
By focusing on lines with a higher ek, the sparsity of the graph grows rapidly and
many small isolated but functional clusters form, as appreciated in figure 12(d), where
the average number of clusters for ek can even be twice the amount seen in the random
case and almost three times the ∆θ(i, j) case. Qualitatively, exactly the same behavior
is observed on synthetic power grids on figure 13, and actually, the Colombian grid
results lay inside the standard deviation of the experiments for synthetic grids. The
values found for T1 and T2 on these simulations are summarized on table 4.
Table 4: Average value of T1 and T2 for the edge resilience testing algorithm.
Colombian grid Synthetic grids
Random ek ∆θ Random ek ∆θ
T1 29.12 3.00 7.00 17.48 4.61 4.14
T2 131.14 117.91 77.00 125.71 116.83 87.33
Finally, for the line resilience procedure over synthetic power grids, the behavior
of the transitions is observed on figure 14. For T1 on panel (a), no clear tendency
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Figure 11: Phase transitions in the node percolation process for synthetic power grids
as a function of K. Insets present the standard deviation sx for each computed data
point.
is observed, besides the expected fact that this transition is, in general, higher for
the random method than for other elimination strategies. Panel (b) however shows
something interesting for T2: for any value of K, attacking the most vulnerable edges
based on the dynamics (∆θ) produces the fastest transition to blackout in the synthetic
power grids, while attacking randomly produces in general the slowest transition.
Furthermore, this transition also reaches the plateau when K is sufficiently large, for
any elimination method, as observed for the node attacking results. Evidently, the
dynamical-based elimination with ∆θ flats so quickly (K = 6) because increasing K
strengthens the transmission lines and thus directly raises ∆θ, as opposed to the node
elimination based on SNBS, where the basin stability is known to be affected by K but
not in the same trivial and immediate way [44, 45].
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Figure 12: Evolution in the structure of the Colombian power grid subject to the
edge elimination algorithm. The shading accounts for the standard deviation calculated
over 500 realizations.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, an algorithm was proposed to test the resilience of power grids against
failures. Our approach differs from others found in the literature since it takes into
consideration dynamical stability against random finite-size disturbances to describe
nodal vulnerability, as well as linear stability of phase differences to compute edge
vulnerability. Sequential elimination of elements in the network based on these
dynamical vulnerabilities was also compared with the same procedure applied to
structural vulnerabilities, which were defined in terms of connectivity patterns in the
topology of the graph. This allowed to extract some interesting findings which will be
discussed in the following.
First of all, focusing nodal attacks on redundantly connected nodes, such as those
with the highest clustering coefficient, is obviously the least effective strategy, being
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Figure 13: Evolution in the structure of the randomly grown synthetic power
grids subject to the edge elimination algorithm. The shading accounts for the standard
deviation calculated over 500 realizations.
comparable with the random removal; the blackout transition T2 for both is always the
highest, meaning that they require more attacks in order to destroy the whole network.
Similarly, the giant component of the graph reduces at the slowest rate, since dividing
the graph into multiple operational clusters is not likely until the redundant links are
removed from the network. Eventually, both methods become essentially the same, once
the clustering coefficient for the whole grid is uniform.
The fastest way to reduce the size of the giant component of the network is, as
expected, to attack the most central nodes, either those with the highest degree or
betweenness; when these bulk nodes are removed, the graph rapidly segregates into
multiple perfectly operational clusters. In other words, the transition to an unconnected
graph T1 is always the lowest for these methods.
For the case of node elimination based on basin stability it was found that the
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Figure 14: Phase transitions in the edge percolation process for synthetic power grids
as a function of K. Insets present the standard deviation sx for each computed data
point.
transition to blackout T2 in the randomly grown synthetic power grids did not differ
significantly to that found for the random removal approach. However, in the specific
case of the Colombian power grid, this method proved to be the most effective to bring
the whole network to total blackout. Essentially, the only key difference between both
test cases is the power distribution: for the synthetic grids the power was initially
distributed uniformly, with an equal number of generators and consumers, but for the
Colombian case only 27% of the initial nodes are generators, and the rest consumers.
This power homogeneity in the synthetic grids then is enhancing the resilience of the
graph, and this was confirmed when it was observed that for the Colombian grid, the
first nodes to be removed are generators, leading to a higher stress in the remaining
power plants: a few generators will have to increase drastically the power they produce
in order to balance the demand. In addition, this power increase in the generators will
reduce their basin stability, that is, it will make them more prone to dynamical random
disturbances in oscillatory frequency and phase angle. This negative correlation between
the power parameter of a node and its non-linear stability is supported by the findings in
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[28]. Interestingly, the number of weak nodes in the power grid (nodes with a low basin
stability level), was found to increase during the node removal procedure focused on
basin stability for both test cases. This implies that this attacking strategy is useful to
undermine the general dynamical stability of the power grid and make it more prone to
random disturbances, even though, it does not necessarily propagate structural failures
to larger proportions of the network (it depends on the amount of generators, as already
explained).
Regarding the line resilience testing performed, it was found that for either the
Colombian power grid or the synthetic power grids, attacking highly central edges, as
those with a high edge betweenness centrality, the graph segregates rapidly into multiple
clusters and the giant component reduces abruptly. The transition to blackout, however,
is not faster than random elimination. It is, as expected, a very similar behaviour to
that found in node elimination through node betweenness. The elimination based on
the dynamical measure of phase difference (∆θ) was found to be the most efficient in
order to bring the whole network to blackout, and remarkably, this behaviour can be
observed for any value tested of the maximum transfer capacity in transmission lines.
Some work is still left open to research such as further exploring the hidden causes
that are yielding the reduction of non-linear stability due to heterogeneous power
distribution. Similarly, a more detailed study on the phase transitions T1 and T2, as
well as the influence of structural parameters in these critical points, could potentially
point in the right direction to design the most appropriate connectivity in a graph and
parameter distribution such that resilience against cascading failures is optimized. More
dynamical measures of vulnerability could also be incorporated in the removal algorithm;
for instance, the diffusivity of perturbations [10] that could indicate regions of faster
failure propagation in the grid, or the multi-node basin stability [23] computed over the
nearest-neighbours, as it would include information about the most vulnerable clusters,
rather than individual elements. This would however impose a higher computational
effort to a task that is already computationally expensive.
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Appendix A. Random growth model for power grids
This section describes the algorithm proposed in [39] which allows to generate complex
networks that incorporate a spatial embedding (accounts for geographic position of
nodes) and that have similar structural properties to those found in real-world power
grids. For this algorithm, a redundancy cost function that will be subject to optimization
has to be defined as:
f(i,j,G) =
(dG(i, j) + 1)
u
dS(yi, yj)
(A.1)
where dG(i, j) is the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j in the graph
G, dS(yi, yj) is the spatial distance (Euclidean distance) between the nodes positions
yi and yj, and u is a parameter that controls the cost-vs-redundancy trade-off. After
defining the parameters from table 1, the construction algorithm is developed through
two phases: initialization and growth, which are performed as follows:
Appendix A.1. Initialization
(i) Initialize a minimum spanning tree for the initial N0 nodes such that it optimizes
the edges that have to be built between them based on the minimum Euclidean
distance dS(yi, yj).
(ii) Let m = bN0(1− s)(p+ q)c. For each h = {1, 2, ...,m} find the pair of nodes (i, j)
that are not yet linked and for which f(i,j,G) is maximal and connect them.
Appendix A.2. Growth
(i) For each h = {1, 2, ..., N −N0} do:
(a) Add a new node h to the graph.
(b) Generate a random number ζ1. If ζ1 ≤ 1− s then:
– Set the position of the new node yh.
– Add a link between the new node h and the closest node j geographically,
that is, the node j for which dS(yh, yj) is minimal.
– Generate a random number ζ2, if ζ2 < p add a link between the new node
h and some node l for which f(h,l,G) is maximal.
– Generate a random number ζ3, if ζ3 < q draw a node h
′ from the network
uniformly at random. Then find the node l′ that is not yet linked to h′
and for whichf(h,l,G) is maximal and connect them.
(c) Otherwise (if ζ1 > 1 − s), select an edge (i, j) of the network uniformly at
random. The new geographic location of node h will be given by yh = (yi+yj)/2,
so the edge (i, j) is removed from the graph and then the edges (i, h) and (h, j)
are added.
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